Tag: hobbs act

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District Court Adopts Narrow ATDS Interpretation, Dismisses TCPA Suit
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U.S. Supreme Court To Rule On Hobbs Act Deference To FCC’s TCPA Rules

District Court Adopts Narrow ATDS Interpretation, Dismisses TCPA Suit

By Joseph C. Wylie II, Molly K. McGinley, and Lexi D. Bond

A district court in Illinois recently dismissed a lawsuit against Yahoo!, Inc. (“Yahoo”) alleging violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”), reversing its previous decision denying summary judgment. In Johnson v. Yahoo! Inc., Case No. 14-cv-2028 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 29, 2018), the court granted Yahoo’s motion for reconsideration based on recent interpretations of the definition of an automatic telephone dialing system (“ATDS”) under the TCPA, particularly the decision in ACA Int’l v. FCC, 885 F.3d 687, 695 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (previously discussed here).  In its ruling, the district court rejected prior Federal Communication Commission (“FCC”) pronouncements and adopted a narrow interpretation of ATDS, holding that only a system that actually dials randomly or sequentially generated numbers can be an ATDS.

Rachel Johnson sued Yahoo in 2014, alleging that Yahoo’s “PC2SMS” texting service was an ATDS and it had used that service to text her in violation of the TCPA. Yahoo’s PC2SMS service caused a text message to be sent to Johnson by pulling her number from a database of stored numbers, an address book, and then automatically sending that number a text message. In an earlier order, the court denied Yahoo’s motion for summary judgment because of disputes over whether PC2SMS was an ATDS under the FCC‘s interpretation of the TCPA. See Johnson v. Yahoo!, Inc., No. 14 CV 2028, 2014 WL 7005102, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 11, 2014). Yahoo asked for reconsideration and for entry of summary judgment based on the holding in ACA Int’l.

In ACA Int’l, the court set aside the FCC’s explanation of what devices qualify as an ATDS. See ACA Int’l, 885 F.3d at 695. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit found that including a device that “can call from a database of telephone numbers generated elsewhere” within the scope of the definition of an ATDS would be incompatible with a definition of ATDS requiring the device to generate random or sequential numbers to be dialed. Id. at 701–03. The FCC’s lack of clarity about the qualifying functions of an ATDS, in addition to its unreasonably expansive understanding of “capacity,” led the court to “set aside the Commission’s treatment of those matters.” Id. at 703.

The district court in Johnson v. Yahoo! explained that it had previously denied summary judgment to Yahoo because it was bound by the FCC’s definition of an ATDS. However, because ACA Int’l changed the premise upon which the earlier ruling was based, the court concluded that reconsideration was appropriate.

Under the TCPA, the term ATDS is defined as equipment which has the capacity “to store or produce telephone numbers, using a random or sequential number generator” and “to dial such numbers”. 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1). Yahoo’s PC2SMS system did not have the capacity to generate random or sequential numbers to be dialed — it dialed numbers from a stored list. In its order granting reconsideration, the court explained that a device that stores or produces numbers without the use of a random or sequential number generator is not an ATDS. Accordingly, Yahoo was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

This decision is noteworthy in that it specifically holds that as a result of ACA Int’l, courts are not bound by prior FCC orders from 2003, 2008, and 2012 interpreting what sort of devices qualify as ATDS; a conclusion that has been reached by other courts in recent decisions, including Marks v. Crunch San Diego, LLC, 904 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir. 2018) (previously discussed here).

Furthermore, the Johnson v. Yahoo! court noted, even if the FCC orders concerning the scope of the term ATDS were not vacated by ACA Int’l, district courts nevertheless may not be bound by FCC’s orders, depending on the outcome in PDR Network, LLC v. Carlton & Harris Chiropractic, Inc., No. 17-1705, 2018 WL 3127423, at *1 (U.S. Nov. 13, 2018) (previously discussed here), in which the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari on whether the Hobbs Act requires the district court to accept the FCC’s legal interpretation of the TCPA.  The Supreme Court decision, which is anticipated next year, is expected to resolve this question and clarify the weight of the FCC’s orders for future TCPA cases.

U.S. Supreme Court To Rule On Hobbs Act Deference To FCC’s TCPA Rules

By Joseph C. Wylie II, Molly K. McGinley, and Lexi D. Bond

             On November 13, 2018 the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari in a Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”) case in which the Fourth Circuit vacated the district court’s holding that an unsolicited fax sent by a health information provider offering a free e-book must have a commercial goal to be considered an advertisement under the TCPA.  This case presents important questions as to the scope of judicial deference to the Federal Communication Commission’s (“FCC”) rules under the Hobbs Act, which limits the ability of TCPA litigants to challenge FCC rules in private civil litigation.

In February of this year, the Fourth Circuit held that faxes that offer goods and services, even if the goods and services are free, are “advertisements” under the TCPA, and reversed the district court’s dismissal of the suit.  See Carlton & Harris Chiropractic, Inc. v. PDR Network, LLC, 883 F.3d 459, 469 (4th Cir. 2018).  In so ruling, the Fourth Circuit took issue with the district court treatment of a 2006 Rule promulgated by the Federal Communications Commission the FCC interpreting certain provisions of the TCPA.  Pursuant to its statutory authority to “prescribe regulations to implement the requirements” of the TCPA, see 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(2), the FCC promulgated a rule providing that “facsimile messages that promote goods or services even at no cost . . . are unsolicited advertisements under the TCPA’s definition.”  See Rules and Regulations Implementing the Tel. Consumer Prot. Act of 1991; Junk Fax Prevention Act of 2005, 71 Fed. Reg. 25,967, 25,973 (May 3, 2006) (the “2006 Order”).  In the district court, plaintiff Carlton & Harris argued that the fax it received was an unsolicited advertisement as defined in the 2006 Order because it promoted a good at no cost.  Carlton & Harris Chiropractic, Inc. v. PDR Network, LLC, No. 3:15-14887, 2016 WL 5799301, at *4 (S.D. W. Va. Sept. 30, 2016).  The district court declined to defer to the 2006 Order, holding that the Hobbs Act did not compel the court to defer to “the FCC’s interpretation of an unambiguous statute.”  Id.  The district court further held that even under the 2006 FCC Rule, PDR Network’s fax was still not an advertisement because the rule requires an advertisement to have a “commercial aim,” and no such aim existed.  Id. Accordingly, it granted PDR Network’s motion to dismiss.

The Fourth Circuit disagreed, holding that the jurisdictional command of the Hobbs Act requires a district court to apply FCC interpretations of the TCPA. See Carlton & Harris Chiropractic, 883 F.3d at 469. The district court therefore erred by engaging in Chevron analysis and “declin[ing] to defer” to the FCC rule and issuing a ruling “at odds with the plaining meaning” of the 2006 Order’s text.  Id. at 462.  Thereafter, PDR Network appealed to the Supreme Court asserting that the Fourth Circuit opinion created a circuit split with the Second, Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits, all of which require a “commercial” nexus for faxes promoting free goods or services to be considered “advertisements” under the TCPA.

PDR Network’s petition for a writ of certiorari asks the Supreme Court to resolve the Circuit split regarding whether the Hobbs Act prevents courts from engaging in a typical Chevron analysis of FCC Orders interpreting the TCPA and requires automatic deference to the agency’s order where there has been no challenge to the validity of the order.  It also asks the Court to resolve whether the FCC’s 2006 Order creates a per se rule that faxes that “promote goods and services even at no costs” are “advertisements” under the TCPA or whether courts can require a commercial nexus to a firms’ business in order for such a fax to fall within the definition of “advertisement.”  In granting certiorari, the Supreme Court said it is limiting the certiorari to the question of whether the Hobbs Act required the lower court to accept the FCC’s legal interpretation of the TCPA.

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