The Consumer and Governmental Affairs Bureau of the Federal Communications Commission (the “FCC”) recently issued public notices for comments on two petitions that seek clarification or reversal of the FCC’s interpretation of the “prior express consent” of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (the “TCPA”). Taken together, the petitions request a reversal of the FCC’s long-standing guidance that a consumer provides “prior express consent” to be contacted on a wireless number by providing that number to a business in connection with a voluntary transaction, thus allowing the business to use autodialed or prerecorded voice calls to the consumer to communicate with the consumer regarding the parties’ relationship. A change to the FCC’s interpretation of “prior express consent” could have significant impact on businesses’ communications with its existing customers.
In a non-precedential opinion issued earlier this week, the Second Circuit held in Leyse v. Lifetime Entertainment Services, LLC, that a class could not be certified in a Telephone Consumer Protection Act case because the plaintiff did not have a list of the recipients of telemarketing phone calls. The Second Circuit followed its own precedent identifying ascertainability as an “implied requirement” under Rule 23. In so ruling, the Second Circuit has further demonstrated the different approaches to ascertainability that federal circuit court apply (previously discussed here).
The Ninth Circuit ruled this week that a customer alleging that his former gym sent him texts in violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”) suffered a concrete injury under the standard set forth in 2016 by the Supreme Court in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins (previously discussed here) but that cancellation of his gym membership was insufficient to establish revocation of consent as required in order for the gym to incur liability under the statute.