The Sixth Circuit reversed a lower court’s denial of class certification and dismissal of an action following a lapsed offer for individual judgment in a decision released earlier this month. In doing so, the Sixth Circuit held that a defendant opposing class certification in a Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”) case on the ground that issues of individualized consent predominate must do more than present “speculation and surmise to tip the decisional scales” because a “possible defense, standing alone, does not automatically defeat predominance.” The court also held that a defendant may not escape potential class-wide liability through an unaccepted offer of individual judgment.
On Wednesday, the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”), which has regulatory authority over the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”), announced that Chairman Tom Wheeler plans to resign as of January 20, 2017, when President-Elect Trump is expected to be inaugurated. Appointed in 2013 by President Obama, Chairman Wheeler’s term was not set to expire until 2018. It is tradition, however, for a sitting chair whose term extends into a new presidential administration to resign when the new president is from the other political party.
In a ruling issued on December 1, 2016, the District Court for the Central District of California denied class certification in a Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”) case due to the putative class representatives’ status as a so-called professional plaintiff. This ruling continues a trend in which courts have significantly limited the ability of professional plaintiffs to bring TCPA class actions. Courts increasingly view professional plaintiffs’ conduct in inviting the complained-of communications as a basis to challenge these plaintiffs’ standing and rendering them inadequate class representatives.
On November 18, 2016, the Federal Communications Commission’s Enforcement Bureau (“Bureau”) released an Enforcement Advisory clarifying the TCPA’s limits on the use of autodialed text messages, known as “robotexts.” The Bureau confirmed that its rules restricting the use of automatic telephone dialing systems include those that deliver texts in addition to those that place calls. The Bureau also clarified the applicable rules regarding consent, texts to reassigned wireless numbers, advertising texts, and enforcement.
Consistent with prior FCC guidance, the Bureau confirmed that the TCPA prohibits autodialed text messages, unless made with the prior express consent of the called party, to any telephone number assigned to a cell phone or other mobile device unless the robotexts fall into one of three exceptions: (1) texts made for emergency purposes; (2) texts that are free to the end user and have been exempted by the Commission, subject to conditions prescribed to protect consumer privacy rights; or (3) texts made solely to collect debts “owed to or guaranteed by the United States.” See 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). The Bureau confirmed that text messages sent through texting apps, “Internet-to-phone” text messaging, and similar technology meet the statutory definition of an autodialer, and therefore fall within these restrictions.
On Monday, the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) declined to intervene in Thorne v. Donald J. Trump for President, Inc., 1:16-cv-04603 (N.D. Ill.). As previously discussed here, a class of plaintiffs sued President-Elect Trump’s campaign alleging violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”) in connection with text messages sent during the campaign. In seeking dismissal of the suit, the campaign argued that the TCPA does not pass muster under the First Amendment. Specifically, the campaign asserted that Congress’s November 2015 exemption of calls relating to government debt constitutes “preferential treatment” and qualifies as a “blatant and egregious form of content discrimination.”
The DOJ did not provide a reason for declining to intervene, and the campaign is now faced with the prospect of going it alone in its First Amendment challenge to the TCPA.
Donald Trump’s presidential campaign recently moved to dismiss a Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”) claim on First Amendment grounds. Thorne v. Donald J. Trump for President, Inc., 1:16-cv-04603 (N.D. Ill.). The class-action complaint alleged that the campaign violated the TCPA by sending text messages without permission. In response, the campaign argued that the TCPA’s prohibition on the use of automatic telephone dialing systems (“ATDS”) for calls or text messages placed to cellular telephones, 47 U.S. Code § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) (the “cell phone ban”), improperly regulates speech on the basis of content. Specifically, the campaign asserted that the ban cannot withstand strict scrutiny because it does not “further a compelling interest” and is not “narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.” Arizona Free Enterprise Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 564 U.S. 721, 734 (2011).
The Second Circuit recently refused to allow a plaintiff to proceed with a putative class action brought under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”) in Bank v. Alliance Health Networks, LLC, finding that he lacked standing after the District Court entered judgment for Defendant in the amount of an unaccepted offer of judgment on Plaintiff’s individual claims.
On Wednesday, October 19, 2016, a panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit (including Hons. Srikanth Srinivasan, Harry T. Edwards, and Cornelia Pillard) heard argument in ACA International v. FCC (D.C. Cir.), the much-anticipated challenge to the FCC’s July 2015 TCPA Order (“July 2015 Order”)(previously discussed here). The court’s questioning of counsel for Petitioners and Respondents focused on a few key issues presented in the ACA’s challenge to the July 2015 Order.
The Southern District of California recently dismissed two Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”) 47 U.S.C. § 227 actions for a failure to allege any concrete injury traceable to defendants. In both actions, the court found that plaintiffs had not alleged any concrete harm traceable to defendants’ alleged violation of the TCPA. Due to this, the court held that plaintiffs lacked standing under Spokeo v. Robins, 136 S.Ct. 1540 (2016) (previously discussed here), in which the U.S. Supreme Court held that “a bare procedural violation, divorced from any concrete harm [does not] satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement of Article III.”
On September 22, 2016, the House Energy and Commerce Committee’s Subcommittee on Communications and Technology held a hearing on modernizing the TCPA. The hearing is significant because it marks the first time that lawmakers on both sides of the aisle have said the TCPA needs to be updated to reflect changing technology and business practices and to draw a distinction between “harassing, malicious” calls from “bad actors” and “legitimate, informational calls that consumers want.” Republican members of the Subcommittee have raised concerns about the TCPA during past FCC oversight hearings, but this hearing actually was held at the request of full Committee Ranking Democrat Member Frank Pallone Jr. (D-NJ), Subcommittee Ranking Democrat Anna Eshoo (D-CA), and congresswoman Jan Schakowsky (D-IL).